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GOVERNANCE
& INSTITUTIONS
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If Bihar as an Indian state is not in the forefront
of development, the reasons must be sought in its political and social
background since Independence. A
state steeped in history which in modern times produced some of the
finest civil servants in the country is today at the nadir of governance—it
is facing a crisis of governability.
Yet its political and social consciousness is perhaps the highest
in India
[1]
. Such crises do occur in other states in the
country. In the state of Bihar
however they appear to be prolonged and virtually insurmountable leading
one to after various solutions to put it back on track. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that there is
an imperative need for government at all levels to reinvent themselves,
redefine their institutional arrangement, laws and structure of authority
and citizenship
[2]
in order to suit the present socio-economic claims.
This shift implies reconfiguring the complex set of institutions and
actors within and beyond the present formal understanding of the government.
The
Problem Bihar like the rest of the
country, adopted a state-centric
[3]
model for socio-economic development. The basic
design of course was formulated by the Planning Commission and was
implemented by the Central and State governments. The agent of change
for this development vision
[4]
was a centralised bureaucracy working under
the political executives. As the development process unfolded, the
state found itself in the clutches of a developmental gap emanating
from the crisis of institutions.
Some of these are Bihar specific while others are more general in
nature but they contribute to the crisis of governability in a much
more acute form than in other states. The crises in various institutions
interact with each other and result in the crisis of governability. Crisis
of Institutions 1.
Political Institutions: a) Governance Priorities
Vs Entrenched Interests There has been a welcome political change in the state
that has seen the mobilization and consolidation of hitherto socially
and economically deprived classes.
Political power as a result has shifted mostly from the traditional
elites to middle peasants and cthe middle lass. Their priorities in governance in general and development in particular
do not necessarily coincide with those of the traditional power holding
class. This mis-match is straining
the system of governance and the pace and pattern of development.
Most of the clashes between the economic haves and have-nots,
for example, the landed and the landless class, flow from this.
Political institutions have yet to acquire a new equilibrium
which is consistent with the unfolding developmental imperatives.
b) Politicisation
of Newer Social Groups and Pressure on Resources The logic of the democratic political process in Bihar
mobilised newer and newer social groups. However the corresponding
political and social institutions that can distribute the available
resources judiciously and equitably are still to be formed. The state
has found itself unable to meet successfully the conflicting political
and economic demands of various social groups. This has diminished
the economic surplus required for the growth of a modern economy in
Bihar. c) Disjunction between
Political and Economic Empowerment
Bihar has given birth to various political and social
movements, which have repeatedly questioned the social and economic
status quo. The intense political mobilisation has resulted in (a)
a horizontal caste solidarity and (b) a vertical class division among
the castes. This mobilisation translated itself into caste based political
empowerment but at the same time it has hampered empowerment on the
basis of economic interest. The disjunction between political and
economic empowerment plays an important role in contributing to the
developmental gap and consequent crisis of governabilty.
Political mobilisation in Bihar has resulted in a curious
interface between the political regime and the bureaucracy. Many present
and former senior bureaucrats of the Bihar Cadre as well as academicians,
development practitioners and social activists have pointed out that
appointments and transfers in the state are increasingly being governed
by the ‘logic’ suiting political empowerment rather than the developmental
needs of the state. Politics and politicians have become dependent
on bureaucratic structures for supplying patronage and meeting personal
ends through ‘committed bureaucracy’
[5]
. This kind of ‘commitment’ of the bureaucracy to
political goals often stands in opposition to developmental goals.
In such a scenario few sincere officers heading the districts embark
on a development agenda which is least for instance, education. This
is termed as ‘soft approach to development’ since it does not involve
any institutionalised intervention for equitably distributing state
resources
[6]
. e) Lack of Desired
Linkages between Micro, Meso and Macro Institutions Political institutions of relevance to development
are located at the central, state as well as local levels. There is much to be desired in terms of their
concern for development at each level.
For reasons historical as well as current, their functioning
lacks coherence and a constructive agenda with a development perspective
and accountability. The political power shared by different political
formation at the centre, on the one hand, and the state on the other,
is bringing severe adverse pressure on the basic development agenda
[7]
. The recent emergence of Panchayat Raj Institutions
has put in place a new set of political institutions with grassroots
contacts. Their own functioning and in tandem with the centre and state is
still evolving and has yet to acquire a desirable rhythm 2.
Institutions of Development a)
Lack of Central Initiative The development agenda and
programme of successive regimes at the Centre whether by design or
default has made Bihar perhaps a case of ‘benign neglect’ till the
1990s. Presently a fair number of professionals and developmental
activists believe that the state is possibly under the spell of malign
neglect. The prime agents of change
under the state-centric model of development were the central intervention
that triggered off growth through investment in public sector enterprises.
In the case of Bihar, there was no central investment in any modern
industry, except coal and steel, which in any case did not substantially
benefit the erstwhile Bihar
[8]
. It is widely felt that there was never sufficient
consideration shown for the unique and special needs of Bihar. The
resources of Bihar (for instance coal and steel) were made available
for national use but the polices and programmes that can improve basic
infrastructure such as roads
[9]
and power remain neglected. The few industries
that came up dried up for lack of funds and contracts
[10]
. None of the major public sector undertakings
except Barauni refinery and Khalegoan thermal plant are located in
Bihar. This has prevented the direct gain that location can offer
by opening up the area for fresh private investment or for providing
employment. As regards social infrastructure there is not even a single
educational institution or a health care facility supported by the
central government. Further, even a sketchy review of access to bank
funds would reveal that most banks have extended resource support
to economic activities in closer proximity to their headquarter location
as seen in the investment pattern in the South and Western Indian
States (Maharashtra, Karnataka, Gujarat). Bihar has neither the headquarter
of any major bank nor its proportionate share of bank branches as
per the share of its population. Even for developmental institutions
such as IDBI, SIDBI, NABARD, Bihar falls beyond the priority attention.
Moreover, the potential in agricultural growth was never tapped because
the central government did not support big irrigation projects on
the lines of Punjab and Haryana thereby triggering off green revolution
in the state. The crisis of Indo-Nepal relationship leaves the North
Bihar totally devastated every year from the perils of man-made floods
thereby forcing the diversion of substantial resources and administrative
machinery at the expense of the long term requirements of Bihar. b)
Failure of Plans A state-centric model banks on centralised data generation
for evolving a plan of action for socio-economic development. It was
not realised that information is not always readily available and
at times unevenly shared among different socio-economic layers and
actors. Further, this model of centralised planning takes into account
the objective realities and often ignores the local subjective preferences.
Most of the Central Government schemes fall in the same category.
Because of this even the well-framed plan foundered. There
is hardly any planning and professional institution in the state that
has the institutional capacity to visualise the dis-aggregated planned
agenda. c)
Incapacity of Delivery Institutions The government institutions responsible
for implementing development schemes have continuously failed to achieve
their projected targets.
·
The Planning Commission's estimates point
out that Bihar’s capacity to plan and absorb plan funds is the lowest
among 14 major states of the country. In the year 1997-98 the state
spent only 75.45 per cent the actual plan outlay. This same figure
stood at 56.02 per cent in the year 2000-01.
·
The Mid Term Appraisal of the Ninth Five
Year Plan (1997-2000) by the Planning Commission, points out that
in the years 1997-98 and 1998-99 nearly 25 per cent and 38 per cent
of the funds respectively, covering around 10
[11]
departments, were left unutilised. The average
expenditure for 14 major states for the same years stands at 91.49
per cent and 87.36 per cent respectively.
·
The financial statements in the plans of
the Rural Development Department which covers 11 schemes
[12]
reveal that 32 per cent and 40 per cent of the
funds for the years 1998-99 & 1999-00 respectively were unutilised
and hence were allowed to lapse.
·
In the Department of Health, Medical Education
and Family Welfare, 20 per cent of the budget provision was left unutilised
under the three major heads of account, namely, medical and public
health, family welfare, and capital outlay on medical and public health.
·
Not a single rupee was sanctioned by the
Ministry of Rural Development for Drinking Water Schemes in the year
1998, because the Bihar government was not able to finalise the procedures
for buying pipes. There are several such examples indicating
substantial gaps between the plan outlay and the actual expenditure
in almost every department of the state. There are two interrelated reasons for this
shortfall in expenditure.
·
State’s
inability to raise its own revenue earnings: The state government
fails in providing matching grants for central schemes, nor can it
carry out its own developmental schemes satisfactorily because of
its incapacity to generate surplus resources. Most of the state resources
are tied up in loss making public corporations, the state electricity
board and in the maintenance of a bloated bureaucracy. Additionally
the returns from the sales tax regime are sub-optimal (see relevant
chapters).
·
Ineffective
delivery institutions: The single chain of
command in all the departments and the consequent centralised decision
making ensures crucial delays. A lot of time and resources are wasted
on the approval of already sanctioned projects. Often by the time
clearance is given, the time period for implementing the sanctioned
scheme(s) lapses and the money is left unutilised. One of the important
reasons for the time overrun is the inability of the existing institutions
to absorb the available developmental funds. In the case of schemes
that do get implemented, it is the dominant social groups that capture
all the benefits. For instance,
a study on the implementation of the Rural Development programme in
Chapra district of Bihar attributes its failure to the lack of a receptive
environment and the decline of political and social institutions.
It found that the delivery institutions were dominated by caste and
class elites, who blocked the effective participation of the target
population (Planning Commission, 2000). The problem is not limited
to the state government. Many of the approved planned projects routed
through the central government departments and /or central government
institutions also fall into the same category (for instance, NABARD,
SIDBI, etc.).
·
Perils
of Centralised Planing Some of the money remains
unutilised because of the centralised nature of the schemes. Most
of the central schemes are justified on a uniform all India basis
and as a consequence they do not reflect the revenue raising capability
(whether for economic or non-economic reasons) of the state nor the
social requirements of the social groups in Bihar. Further some of
the central government supported schemes demand progressive increase
in the state’s contribution. There are many instances where the state
government is unable to maintain the existing infrastructure created
for the implementation of the scheme because of the progressive increase
of the state’s share. d)
Institution of Bureaucracy As discussed before, the centralised bureaucracy was
visualised as an agent of change. Each department was organised into
staff and line functions. It was to be development oriented
[13]
in goal and neutral in approach working under a
single chain of command. This brought up certain unexpected problems:
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